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BOOK REVIEW
DATA BANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY. By ALAN F. WESTIN and MICHAEL
A. BAKER. New York, New York: Quadrangle Books 1972, xxi + 522
pages $12.50.
REcoRDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: Report of the
Secretary's Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems.
Washington, D.C.: DHEW Publication No. (OS) 73094. (concurrently
published: Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology Press) 1973, xxxv + 346 pages $2.35 (paper).
MARY KAY KANE*
INTRODUCTION
Mankind's urge to pry, intrude, and eavesdrop is as old and basic
as Curiosity itself. As pointed out by one commentator, "[s]how me a
man who doesn't eavesdrop, and I'll show you a man with a serious
hearing problem."' However, the human memory is exhaustible, and
it eventually fades. Written records are more durable; but they are
costly to compile, expensive to preserve and inaccessible in proportion
to their bulk. What the computer has done is to create virtually un-
limited capacity to record, store and retrieve every bit of trivia about
human lives, sometimes because it simply is easier to record the fact
than to discard it, at other times because it is laudable and useful to
do so. But most often this is done with no regard for the risk that at
some later date the information may be used for different or destruc-
tive ends.
"*Assistant Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo; J.D.,
University of Michigan, 1971. Additional information bearing upon my qualifications
to review these books, as well as upon my possibly disqualifying biases, is that I was
the Associate Director, with Professor Arthur R. Miller of Harvard Law School, of a
National Science Foundation project studying problems of privacy and social and
behavioral science research data (GS-35291). Our report for that study will be avail-
able shortly to the public. However, I am obliged to say what should be obvious-
the views I express in this review are my own; they should not be attributed to the
National Science Foundation, nor to Professor Miller. Finally, I would like to express
my appreciation to Professors Ronald J. Allen and Paul Goldstein, both of the State
University of New York at Buffalo School of Law, for their helpful comments on
earlier drafts of this review.
1. Schwartz, The Hearing Tom is Everywhere, NEWSDAY, Jan. 9, 1965, (magazine),
at 9W, col. 1.
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The two publications under review address themselves to this
modern phenomenon-the computer-in attempts to determine
whether 20th century record keeping does in fact pose greater threats
to individual privacy 2 and, if so, what are the means of reducing or
remedying this threat. The books appear to reach different, almost
opposing, determinations as to the potential dangers of computerized
record keeping and, as is so often the case, the reader may be con-
vinced by the effectiveness of the authors' advocacy rather than by the
merits of their position. Thus, in addition to commenting on the style
and persuasiveness of each volume, it is my intention to examine the
factual bases on which the authors rely in the hope of reaching an in-
dependent judgment on the question of the effects of modern data
practices on the rights of citizens.
The Westin-Baker book, Databanks in a Free Society, deserves
consideration by policymakers in the privacy arena for several reasons.
Westin is renowned as a researcher and thinker in the field of per-
sonal privacy. Furthermore, the publication carries with it the 'sub-
stantial prestige of sponsorship by the Russell Sage Foundation and
the Computer Science and Engineering Board of the National
Academy of Sciences. It professes to be an empirical investigation,
by "a staff well versed in computer science, economics, journalism,
law, political science, psychology, and sociology," 3 of the range of
actual and potential computer abuse. As stated in its introduction,
the book presents "a comprehensive body of facts about the actual
effects that computers, communications, and allied information tech-
nologies have had on creating, sharing, and using files on individuals." 4Based on their field research, the authors perceive few problems
(to which they offer solutions), concluding that computers despite
their potential do not now, and probably will not in the foreseeable
2., "Privacy is the right to live one's life in one's own way, to formulate and
hold one's own beliefs, and to ex-press thoughts and share feelings without fear of
observation or publicity beyond that which one seeks or acquiesces in." OrriFon OF
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRIVACY
AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH 8 (1967). See also Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890). Utilizing this definition, when an organ-
ization either obtains personal information without the consent of the individual about
whom it pertains or transmits personal data to others without his consent, a breach
of privacy occurs. Thus, the central question in both books is to what degree the
development of the computer and communications technologies facilitates unauthorized
access.
3. A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, DATABANKS IN A FREE SocIETY xx (1972).
4. Id. at xix.
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future, pose a substantial threat to the privacy of American citizens.
In short, the study carries impressive credentials, the aura of sound
methodology, and persuasive argumentation. However, a close ex-
amination of exactly what is being said reveals glaring inconsistencies
and a failure to appreciate some of the important implications of the
data that was collected from the numerous organizations visited.
In contrast, the HEW report, Records, Computers and the Rights
of Citizens, is hardly a book at all, nor is it the type of document that
typically attracts the attention of a book reviewer or the general pub-
lic. Nonetheless, among the members of the Secretary's Advisory Com-
mittee, who were responsible for the report, were many persons in the
private and public sectors actively engaged in the assembly and re-
cording of information about people, as well as computer specialists
and noted civil libertarians. 5 Hence it is fair to assume that they also
knew something about the dangers of which they spoke. In addition,
the Committee's staff presented reports and arranged hearings at which
testimony was given by over 100 witnesses representing more than 50
different organizations. On the basis of this evidence the Committee
concluded that the problem of preserving privacy is not only acute,
but also is growing worse in almost direct proportion to the availability
of computer capacity.
I. THE FimiNDjs
A. The Westin-Baker Study
As examples of the findings made from 55 site visits to various
organizations in 1970-1971, Westin and Baker present 14 profiles of
record keeping in different spheres of life-for example, law enforce-
ment, credit bureaus, municipal governments, and religious organiza-
.5. The Committee's members were: Willis H. Ware (Chairman), Professor Lay-
man E. Allen, Juan A. Anglero, Senator Stanley J. Aronoff, Assemblyman William T.
Bagley, Professor Philip M. Burgess, Gertrude M. Cox, K. Patricia Cross, Gerald L.
Davey, J. Taylor DeWeese, Guy H. Dobbs, Robert R. J. Gallati, Florence R. Gaynor,
John L. Gentile, Dr. Frances Grommers, Commissioner Jane L. Hardaway, James C.
Impara, Patricia J. Lanphere, Professor Arthur R. Miller, Don M. Muchmore, Jane V.
Noreen, Roy Siemiller, Mrs. Harold Silver, Sheila M. Smythe, and Professor Joseph
Weizenbaum. HEW, REcoRDs, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS xii- xii
(1973).
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tions.6 Analyzing the data obtained from these visits, the authors ar-
rived at the following observations:
(1) "the content of computerized records about individuals has not
increased in scope compared to what was collected in their manual.
counterparts during the precomputer era";7
(2) "the information that is considered most sensitive and subjective
in each type of organization has not yet been put into computerized
files, but is being maintained in manual records" ;8
(3) "precomputer rules [on data sharing] have not been altered in
computerizing organizations; rather, customary practices have been
reproduced with almost mirrorlike fidelity."9
From these "facts" they conclude that earlier predictions that na-
tional, interlocking systems would erode traditional and cherished
notions of privacy and even due process were inaccurate as well as
totally uninformed and that computerization, in and of itself, poses
little threat to these rights. 10
A careful perusal of the profiles casts some doubts on the question
whether there was sufficient evidence to support their position. For
example, the organizations visited generally indicated that more sensi-
tive data or increased data about file subjects were not being collected
6. The choice of organizations that were profiled is somewhat deceptive. Pur-
portedly the profiles reflect "the real world of computerizing organizations during the
past decade and today." A. WEs iN & M. BAKER, supra note 3, at 5. Clearly they do
represent some of the better known and large organizations engaging in data banking.
At least in some instances, however, that very prominence meant that better con-
fidentiality control was exercised. For example, the Social Security Administration was
described as an example of federal government record-keeping. That agency represents
one of the few which have grappled with privacy problems. As the HEW report in-
dicates, activities throughout the other sections of HEW were less laudable. Similarly,
the American Council on Education was chosen as the research model. Again, that
organization represents the exception rather than the rule in terms of the security
measures taken. More typical research practices are described and analyzed in the
forthcoming NSF report with which I have been connected.
7. Id. at 244.
8. Id. at 249.
9. Id. at 253.
10. The authors are strongly critical of the journalists who initially stirred up
public alarm about data keeping policies, arguing that these reporters overreadted.
Id. at 269-79. Nevertheless, their own studies show numerous cases in which corrective
policies were instituted only in response to just such pressure. See, e.g., id. at 85-88
(Kansas City, Missouri, Police Department); d. at 105-07 (Santa Clam County,
California); id. at 178-79 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology). Thus it is just as
easy to conclude that without that pressure, which resulted in the exercise of s6ble
self restraint, some of the fears expressed by the early journalists would have come to
pass.
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as 'a result of computerization. At the same time, however, some of
the persons interviewed mentioned that improved technology had re-
sulted in the collection and retention of files on greater numbers of
people" and in greater dissemination due to increased access.' 2 Ex-
panding the number of existing files, as well as their transferability
arid accessibility, clearly poses a threat to privacy. Yet, these develop-
me nts appear to be either overlooked or viewed as of little moment
by the authors. If the former were the case, the soundness of their
findings could be disputed. But it is not. Westin and Baker firmly
state that a direct effect of computerization is the creation of larger
databases' 3 and the greater use of the information in those files.14
Thus, they must have determined that these effects were not worthy of
concern. This being so, then I question their definition of privacy,
which, to my mind, always has included the individual's right to de-
cide to whom to reveal his own data.
Any doubts about the conclusions reached in this study are not
aided by the fact that even Westin and Baker appear unconvinced by
their findings.' 5 The last sentence of their book states:
Our task is to see that appropriate safeguards for the individual's
rights to privacy, confidentiality, and due process are embedded in
every major record system in the nation, particularly the computer-
izing systems that promise to be the setting for most important or-
ganizational uses of information affecting individuals in the coming
decades.'6
11. For example, in their discussion of the Bank of America the authors alleged
that "the expansion of bank services to include Bank Americard and the creation of
its massive files-high volume transactions for 1.9 million accounts-is largely attribu-
table to the availability of computer technology." Id. at 122.
12. For example, personnel at the New York State Department of Motor Ve-
hides stated that computerization had meant a "much greater use of our system by law-
enforcement agencies." Id. at 75. Also, officials at R.L. Polk & Co. talked about plans
for an immense linking capacity that would be possible because of the availability
of computers. Id. at 167.
13. Id. at 293-94.
14. Id. at 284-88.
15. At one point, they state: "What is significant for public policy understanding
is that these managers conceive of computerization as neither an experiment nor a
matter of much choice. They see it instead as a necessity . . . ." Id. at 234. They also
admit that they "did observe the emergence through computerization and rapid com-
munications systems of regional and national data systems) that are linking more
closely organizations that had shared information in the manual era, and that these
networks are giving rise to some new patterns of information handling and use." Id.
at 291.
16. Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
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How can this statement be reconciled with their earlier findings that
computerized record keeping does not threaten individual liberties?
The first -set of observations indicating the benign character of
computerization represents the major portion of the book, which may
induce a false sense of security for the reader who does not discern
this apparent conflict. In addition, the subsequent exhortation and
suggestions for better record keeping practices necessarily lose some of
their potential effectiveness because little need will be perceived to
develop means to prevent what the authors had argued are nonexistent
abuses.
Any feeling of complacency would be dangerous. All the Westin-
Baker findings reflect is the fact that early enthusiasts underestimated
the cost, time, and difficulties inherent in computerization.1" The au-
thors argue that "sociopolitical" forces will keep record keeping and
computerization from getting out of control.18 But, those forces are
aroused only after a threat has been perceived. Thus, we are right
back where we started before the release of the Wesin-Baker data,
recognizing that problems will result from expanded uses of personal
information unless we act now.
Let me make clear that I do not contend that the authors fail
to see the crucial questions posed by increased data collection. Their
suggestions for control mechanisms in the last chapter belie that con-
clusion. However, in their treatment of the profiles of organizations
visited they focus so intently on the question of what records or pieces
of information have been converted from manual to computer files
and on the data handling practices, that they completely fail to point
out the important confidentiality problems created by the record sys-
tems as they now exist. One might reasonably ask why it is so impor-
tant whether organizations are collecting more data as a direct result
17. For example, the authors' profile of the failure in New Haven, Connecticut,
to achieve the originally planned fully computerized central databank for municipal
government illustrates the unrealistic approach taken by many data managers when
computers first began to be utilized on a large scale. Id. at 88-100. As Westin and
Baker describe it, city officials indulged in what might be termed "blue-skying," pro-
posing and expecting a fully automated system, but not taking into account the time
and research necessary to meet their requirements. The failure of that venture did
not discourage the city administrators, however. All it did was make them more
realistic in their expectations. As the Controller, Frank Kelly, stated: " 'We'll seek
federal or state funds on a program-by-program basis to computerize only those things
that are doable.' " Id. at 100.
18. Id. at 323-24.
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of tccmputerization or as a result of other causes. The point is that
they are doing so, and the authors do not deny that computer capacity
eventually, if not at the present time, will ease the problems of storage
and dissemination.
For example, one of the conclusions of this study was that "cus-
tomary" data sharing practices are continuing even after initial com-
puterization.19 What does this mean? As the authors admit, informal
data sharing is taking place under the "information buddy system," 20
although this is not generally known by the public and is even in
direct violation of formal confidentiality rules.21 The crux of the mat-
ter is, of course, that the computer makes violation much easier-a
problem which Westin and Baker should have addressed.
Another criticism of their study is that in some cases their in-
vestigations did not go far enough. Illustratively, time and again
Westin and Baker note that subjective, sensitive data generally are
left in manila files. But, this clearly does not solve all confidentiality
problems. To begin with, is there a computerized entry indicating the
existence of the manual file? For example, a computerized university
system might include student grade records and the credit awarded
for courses taken. Subjective data, such as a counselor's report or
teacher evaluation, might be kept in manual files in the counseling
office. One of the main security protections for this information is the
fact that few know it exists. However, if there is a computerized entry
in the student's central file indicating that psychiatric or counseling
19. The discussion of data sharing practices also presents an example of ap-
parently inconsistent positions taken by the authors. After concluding that those activi-
ties have not been altered by the advent of computers, the authors go on to note:
"In the public records area, we found that greater volumes of information have been
made available to users because of computerization, and often to a larger number of
users." Id. at 254. This expansion, they maintain, is not important because the class
of users remains the same. But, the fact that the same type of data users as in the
precomputer era participates in the computerized system does not, to my mind, a
fortiori mean that no threats are posed. Much more data are now available to the
user. For example, I might not object that my employer had access to my income
information, but I would be distressed to discover that by a single request he could
obtain my voting and marital history records in addition.
20. The "information buddy system" permits officially unacknowledged data
sharing based on the personal relationships of individuals within and without a given
organization. It exists typically because many corporate security officers and insurance
and credit investigators are former federal or local law enforcement agents, permitting
a flow of information between those agencies and the private organizations with which
the former members are associated.
21. A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, supra note 3, at 253.
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data are maintained elsewhere and if entry to that general record is
available to a wide range of persons, then the manual file loses its
anonymous character. Unfortunately, the authors never address this
problem of computer indexes.
Perhaps I am overly skeptical, but I cannot get rid of the feeling
that Westin and Baker accepted too readily the statements made by
data handlers about their plans and cautions for the future.22 Al-
though they apparently felt that full cooperation was given them,,
one may question whether it is reasonable to expect information man-
agers to be perfectly candid about their plans. It should be recalled
that the interviews took place in 1970-1971 following extensive hear-
ings on the commercial credit industry and privacy, and on databank-
ing in general. In that atmosphere, it is just as reasonable to assume
that managers would be quick to make self-serving statements to dis-
associate themselves from any of the questionable practices revealed
before the Congress. Moreover, the computer industry was entering
a period of economic recession so that long-range plans for major ex-
pansions probably were not then feasible.2 4 Finally, the technology
22. A case in point is the data base maintained by the American Council on
Education. ACE officials contend that because the data which links names and re-
sponses are stored outside the country, the research data are free from subpoena
since ACE does not control the link. Westin and Baker appear to accept this con-
clusion. Id. at 192. However, during my own interviews with ACE personnel in con-
nection with the research mentioned earlier (see note * supra), I discovered that com-
plete independence was not maintained between ACE and the linking agency. Indeedj
the Council had sent some of its own programmers to aid in solving some of the
linking agency's problems. ACE may be deemed to have some control over that
agency, and, if so, a subpoena to it could require it to produce the linking data. See
Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
Another example is the authors' treatment of grant-in-aid and similar govern-
mental programs. Cavalierly, they dismiss these programs as presenting almost no
threat to privacy because HEW receives only statistical reports. A. WESTIN E M.
BARER, supra note 3, at 31. But a closer look at how those programs operate shows
that personalized, identifiable data often are forwarded to the federal government.
See HEW, supra note 5, at 91-92.
23. A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, supra note 3, at 27.
24. The authors themselves note this effect. Id. at 240. At the time Westin and
Baker wrote they expressed the view that certain business economics would deter the
use of computers for socially wasteful and destructive purposes. Events have shown,
however, that the evolution of ever more capacious and sophisticated machines has
created a problem of excess capacity. As idle hands are said to make mischief, idle
machines cry out to be used. Enterprises that could not possibly afford a computer,
can and do have computer service available to them. Association of Data Processing
Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), may seem to lawyers to
be an important case on standing to sue; it is at least as important as a reflection
of the fact that excess capacity will not stand idle.
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necessary to develop the communications links that would be the core
of any national interlocking of databases and easy user access had
lagged far behind hardware and software developments, so that those
systems were not possible in 1970-1971. However, there already have
been significant technological advances (and networking through
packetswitching appears to be on the horizon), which would lower
the cost of computer communications and networking significantly.25
B. The HEW Report
The approach taken by the HEW Committee was vastly different
from that of Westin and Baker. The Committee held public hearings
at which its members cross-examined information managers. It may
very well be that this searching for facts in what was akin to an ad-,
versarial setting revealed more accurately and more extensively the
true state of affairs. In part, this may explain why the HEW report
reaches conclusions almost directly opposing those of Westin and
Baker. In the words of the Committee:
IT]he application of computers to record keeping has challenged
traditional constraints on record-keeping practices. The computer en-
ables organizations to enlarge their data-processing capacity substan-
tially, while greatly facilitating access to recorded data, both within
organizations and across boundaries that separate them. In addition,
computerization creates a new class of record keepers whose func-
tions are technical and whose contact with the suppliers and users
of data are often remote.
... [T]he net effect of computerization is that it is becoming much
easier for record-keeping systems to affect people than for people to
affect record-keeping systems.26
As alluded to above, the HEW Committee focused on an impor-
tant point that was not considered by Westin and Baker-the creation
of a class of trained data managers to manipulate the computers, and
the implications this might have on citizens' rights. Computerized
record keeping, coupled with the increased mbbility of our popula-
tion, clearly has reduced the interpersonal character of decisionmak-
25. See Browne, Security in Computer Networks, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF STAND-
ARDS, APPROACHES TO PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN COMPUTER SYSTEMS 32-37 (NBS
Special Pub. No. 404, 1974).
26. HEW, supra note 5, at xix-xx.
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ing. Today's merchant or banker does not decide whether an applicant
is credit worthy on the basis of an interview and an assessment of his
present assets. Rather, he may check with the Bank of America com-
puter, housing that person's entire credit history as well as 1.9 million
others.27 In a very real sense the managers and computer personnel
at the databank, who most typically have never met the file subject,
control his credit life. Whether he obtains the necessary credit will
depend on whether these persons have recorded all his past transac-
tions completely and accurately. Thus the HEW report justifiably
addresses this situation as a potential problem, stating: "If we can
comfortably assume that computers will not take control of anything
on their own volition, we may still feel some disappointment that the
application of computers will tend to remain in the hands of trained
specialists whose competence is primarily in data processing rather
than in the fields that data processing serves." 2
Unfortunately, the HEW report does not include concrete ex-
amples of the findings from their hearings. For the most part, we are
asked to accept on faith the needs perceived and the solutions sug-
gested. This is the greatest shortcoming of this report. I am persuaded
that the approach it suggests is both necessary and sound because my
personal experience has demonstrated to me that the factual under-
pinning exists. I attended several days of the Committee's hearings
as an observer and heard some of the startling revelations of record
keepers regarding their practices. Further, in my own field research
in this area I have seen time and again the types of abuses and lack
of sensitivity on the part of data managers that the Committee is try-
ing to combat.
II. REMEDLES
The privacy solutions offered by each book are remarkably similar
in philosophy as well as approach, both concluding that a legislative
resolution of the problem is best. However, the solutions suggested
by Westin and Baker are too general and too vague to be of much
27. A. WESTiN & M. BAKER, supra note 3, at 119.
28. HEW, supra note 5, at 22.
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assistance.29 They simply restate the same basic principles-that rights
of access and challenge must be afforded, and rules of confidentiality
and data sharing must be effectuated. Perhaps the authors were
trapped by their own desire to be all-inclusive. They admit, and I
concur, that no single law can solve the privacy-computer problem.30
However, their field research covered a wide variety of different areas.
The logical approach would have been to tackle each area separately,
detailing the possible measures that might be applied there. This they
clearly were unable to do-through no fault of their own. As illus-
trated by the HEW report dealing only with that agency's own record
keeping practices, devising solutions for the problems of a particular
agency is a monumental task. It would be unrealistic to expect Westin
and Baker to deal in detail with data handling and storage procedures
for each of the organizations they visited, given the time frame in
which they were working.
The remedies portion of Databanks in a Free Society also suffers
from the fact that virtually total reliance is placed on a statutory ap-
proach. Rejecting a judicial solution as too slow and unlikely to be
achieved and not attempting to make any administrative suggestions
(except the use of an information trust agency, an idea that has been
discussed at least since 1968),31 the authors place their faith in the
legislature.
Throughout their book, Westin and Baker argue that unlike their
predecessors they are taking a realistic view of the situation, based on
empirical fact. Experience with the legislative approach, however, indi-
cates that exclusive reliance on that mechanism is unrealistic. The
first major federal privacy legislation did not appear until the 1970
Federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.3 2 Although several privacy bills
29. For example, the authors make the following statement, without any eluci-
dation or suggestions on implementation.
Where the fault lies with insufficiently clear or detailed policy directives,
these must be reformulated. Where the fault is with inadequate administrative
supervision and enforcement mechanisms, those must be revised. And where
technological safeguards are required to give effect to those confidentiality
rules, society has a right to insist that safeguards be installed appropriate
to the dangers involved.
A. WEsTiN & M. BAxER, supra note 3, at 373.
30. Id. at 350.
31. Hearings on Computer Privacy Before the Subcomm. on Administrative
Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 90th Cong., 2d Sess.,
pt. 2, at 310-11 (1968).
32. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-81t (1970).
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were introduced after that act and despite the public outrage and ex-
tended hearings in 1971 over army surveillance,as it was not until
the recent revelations of government spying and record keeping in
connection with the Watergate scandal that the Congress again at-
tempted to act. This most recent law is the Privacy Act of 1974,34
which provides a code of information practices for government record-
keeping and establishes a privacy board to oversee the administration
of that code. But the powers of that board appear weak, and it is un-
clear what actual effect the law will have. Moreover, its limited scope
attacks only one aspect of the privacy problem, and further regula-
tion is needed.
Unlike Westin and Baker, the HEW report sets out specific rec-
ommendations for action, as well as proposing a "Code of Fair In-
formation Practices"as which would include principles providing that:
1) no record keeping system be kept a secret;
2) file subjects be given access to their files and information re-
garding how it is used;
3) a method be provided to prevent information collected for
one purpose from being used for another without the file subject's
consent;
4) procedures exist for ways to correct inaccurate files; and
5) data keepers assure the reliability of their information and
prevent its misuse.
Although the HEW Committee also concludes that a legislative reso-
lution is the best, it goes on to recognize that legislatures are not al-
ways quick to act and, as a result, recommends interim administrative
safeguards. In short, the HEW report provides a workable guide for
action.36
In keeping with its more detailed approach, the HEW Commit-
33. Hearings on Federal Data Banks, Computers and the Bill of Rights Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
34. Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (Dec. 31, 1974).
35. HEW, supra note 5, at 41.
36. In fairness to Westin and Baker it should be pointed out that the task given
to them by the National Academy of Sciences and the Russell Sage Foundation em-
phasized fact finding on the "actual effects" of modem technology on "creating,
sharing, and using files on individuals," rather than on devising solutions to per-
ceived problems. A. WESTIN & M. BAKER, supra note 3, at xix. In contrast, the
charge to the HEW Committee was, among other things, to make recommendations
on "[s]afeguards that might protect against potentially harmful consequences," and on
"[m]easures that might afford redress for any harmful consequences." HEW, supra note
5, at ix.
BOOK REVIEW
tee discusses issues not even alluded to in the other book. For exam-
ple, emphasis is placed on the need for informed consent (informing
an individual whether he is legally required to give data and the spe-
cific consequences of providing that data) and on restricting the trans-
fer of data between organizations unless the individual about whom
the data pertains consents or the transferee system demonstrates that
it adheres to the same privacy safeguards which govern the transferor
system. These suggestions, as well as others set out in the notes,3 7 are
based on what is described as a principle of mutuality in record keep-
ing. "A record containing information about an individual in identifi-
able form must . . . be governed by procedures that afford the indi-
vidual a right to participate in deciding what the content of the record
will be, and what disclosure and use will be made of the identifiable
information in it." '38
A further example of the refined character of the approach taken
in the HEW report is its attempt to distinguish between administra-
tive and statistical systems for purposes of applying safeguards. The
different purposes behind the creation of each of these records indicate
that different solutions to potential privacy problems may be appro-
priate. Illustratively, since by definition a system maintained exclu-
sively for statistical reporting and research is developed not for the
benefit of the individual file subjects but to serve the ends of the
agency desiring the statistics, it was felt that any personal data stored
therein should be protected by statute from compulsory disclosure in
identifiable form.3 9 At the same time, there was no requirement which
guaranteed data subjects access to their files. Since their files were not
designed to affect their rights there was no need to afford them a means
of monitoring the data keeping practices. Whether the reader agrees
that the suggested safeguards are appropriate is not the issue, the fact
is that by engaging in such a refined approach, the HEW Committee
aptly demonstrates one way of attacking the privacy problem created
by modern record keeping practices. It is the careful attention given
to issues such as the above that distinguishes this book and makes it
invaluable.
37. Among other things, the HEW Committee suggests that a log be maintained
on those persons who have access to each file so that the subject can better monitor
the use of his data. HEW, supra note 5, at 56. In addition, a recommendation is made
that individual file subjects be notified before the record keeper complies with any
subpoenas requesting access. Id. at 63.
38. Id. at 41.
39. Id. at 96.

